Updating supposing and maxent Chat between guy and girl sex

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And it turns out that this book is a convenient source for a lot of his important work on the application of mathematics to philosophical questions about induction and epistemology, as well as some intriguing ideas for metaphysics.The subtitle of the volume is "Essays on Quantity, Coherence, and Induction".He argued that the entropy of statistical mechanics and the information entropy of information theory are principally the same thing.Consequently, statistical mechanics should be seen just as a particular application of a general tool of logical inference and information theory.In most practical cases, the stated prior data or testable information is given by a set of conserved quantities (average values of some moment functions), associated with the probability distribution in question.This is the way the maximum entropy principle is most often used in statistical thermodynamics.We explain that this is so because, contrary to what the value of learning requires, one's prior degrees of belief might not be equal to the expectation of one's posterior degrees of belief.This, in turn, points towards a more general moral: that the justification of MRE updating in terms of the value of learning may be sensitive to the context of a given learning experience.

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When judged under standards of dynamic coherence appropriate to (1), MAXENT is found wanting.

When judged in terms of the logic appro-priate to (2) MAXENT yields for convex closed constraint sets a reason-able selection function with interesting connections with sufficiency andconditioning.

Indeed it is just the features of MAXENT which make itappropriate for (2) which make it inappropriate for (1). But it is part of the logic ofsupposition rather than the logic of induction.

First, by representing MRE updating as a conditioning model, we show that MRE satisfies the value of learning in cases where learning prompts a complete redistribution of one's degrees of belief over a partition of propositions.

Second, we show that the value of learning may not be generally satisfied by MRE updates in cases of updating on a change in one's conditional degrees of belief.